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A B S T R A C T
This paper aims to get a better understanding of the motivational and transaction cost features of
building global scientiﬁc research commons, with a view to contributing to the debate on the design of
appropriate policy measures under the recently adopted Nagoya Protocol. For this purpose, the paper
analyses the results of a world-wide survey of managers and users of microbial culture collections, which
focused on the role of social and internalized motivations, organizational networks and external
incentives in promoting the public availability of upstream research assets. Overall, the study conﬁrms
the hypotheses of the social production model of information and shareable goods, but it also shows the
need to complete this model. For the sharing of materials, the underlying collaborative economy in
excess capacity plays a key role in addition to the social production, while for data, competitive pressures
amongst scientists tend to play a bigger role.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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research
The importance of international cooperation for basic biodiver-
sity research has been recognized since the very ﬁrst debates on the
design of global environmental governance regimes. Principle 20 of
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment underlines that the ‘‘free ﬂow of up-to-
date scientiﬁc information and transfer of experience must be
supported and assisted, to facilitate the solution of environmental
problems’’ (UN Declaration on the Human Environment, 1972).
However, in spite of important international initiatives, such as the
Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF) or the International
Nucleotide Sequence Database Collaboration (INSDC), no clear legal
and institutional framework has emerged to support such coopera-
tion. Moreover, an increase in restrictions on global access to basic
research assets has been documented in speciﬁc ﬁelds of life science
research, with a potential detrimental impact on access to scientiﬁc
publications, research samples and genomic databases (Jinnah and
Jungcurt, 2009: 464; Reichman and Okediji, 2012). In addition,* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: tom.dedeurwaerdere@uclouvain.be (T. Dedeurwaerdere).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2015.08.006
1462-9011/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articcompetitive pressures amongst scientists tend to counter-balance
the social norms of scientiﬁc research communities, leading for
example to delays in release of scientiﬁc results and research data
(Dasgupta and David, 1994).
In this context, the Nagoya Protocol (Nagoya Protocol on Access to
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Beneﬁts
Arisingfrom Their Utilizationto theConvention on BiologicalDiversity,
2010) offers an important opportunity for contributing to the
emergence of an international institutional framework for biodiversity
research. On the one hand, the implementation of the Protocol might
add to the existing challenges for the functioning of the commons, but
on the other, the Protocol also presents opportunities for a mutually
supportive implementation between the existing practices of sharing
of essential research assets and the access and beneﬁt sharing regime.
Indeed, as can be seen in particular  in the annex to the Protocol, a broad
variety of non-monetary beneﬁt-sharing measures are envisioned as
means to organize a fair and equitable sharing of research beneﬁts
between participating countries, which can be used to create a
collaborative framework for the upstream dimensions of the research
cycle. Moreover, different articles of the Protocol, such as articles 8,
10 and 11 explicitly address the issue of non-commercial and/or
transboundary research cooperation.
Governments and research institutions throughout the world
have already taken steps in the direction of such a mutuallyle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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facilitated access to biological resources for non-commercial
research in Australia or Brazil, amongst others, and the recom-
mendations for accessing biological resources in basic research
adopted by the German Research Foundation, DFG. However, these
steps deal with the regulation of case by case bilateral transactions
over single research assets and not with the building of global
scientiﬁc infrastructures. In general, with the notable exception of
the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources, little attention
has been given to the likely consequences of the implementation of
the Protocol for such global collaborations.
With a view to contributing to a better understanding of this
issue, this paper analyses the functioning of global collaborations
for biodiversity research in the speciﬁc ﬁeld of microbiology. The
ﬁeld of microbiology has a long history of global collaboration,
especially between the ex situ collections of microbial organisms
that are member of the World Federation for Culture Collections
(WFCC, cf. www.wfcc.info). The World Federation is a multidisci-
plinary commission of the International Union of Biological
Sciences (IUBS) and has been actively promoting collaboration
amongst the major collections in the world, in particular through
the establishment of common standards for exchange and the
building of an information network between the collections and
their users (the so-called World Data Centre for Microorganisms).
Therefore the case of the microbial culture collections is
particularly interesting, as these collections have a well-estab-
lished history of managing global scientiﬁc research commons.
Within this speciﬁc context, this study aims to analyze what
factors contribute to the public availability of the upstream
research assets managed by the culture collections, including
upstream research materials and associated genomic data.
The paper is organized as follows. First, some major challenges
for organizing global collaboration with microbial resources are
presented (Section 2). Second, some of the limits of the
conventional public economy approach for understanding global
commons are analyzed and the principles of an alternative,
collaborative economy model, outlined (Section 3). Third, the
paper analyses the functioning of this model through a survey of
two existing practices of building global commons: sharing of basic
research materials between public culture collections and public
deposits of genomic information by the collection managers and/or
scientists contributing materials to the collections (Section 4). The
paper concludes with an overview of some options and best
practices that result from the analysis. These research results show
the need to consider a broad interpretation of the notion of non-
commercial use in the implementation of the Protocol, in order to
preserve these commons based exchange practices that are essential
to global cooperation for basic biodiversity research (Section 5).
2. Global scientiﬁc research commons in microbial resources
and associated genomic data
2.1. Use of microbial diversity for public health, food security and
biodiversity conservation
Microorganisms are supporting the health of most ecosystems
on earth and play a key role in many important issues, such as
agriculture and food production and human health. For instance,
microorganisms play a major role in soil fertility and are employed
in disease diagnostics, efﬁcacy testing of drugs, and vaccine
production amongst others. Furthermore, microorganisms play a
direct role in widely used biotechnology applications, which
include the biological control of pests and diseases in agriculture
and horticulture, production of natural products for pharmaceuti-
cal, food and other applications, bioremediation and detoxiﬁcation
of wastes.Both private and public sector organizations collect, use and
distribute microorganisms on a massive scale. The global market
value for microbial products – used as biopesticides in agriculture
as well as in chemical production – is an estimated $156 billion in
2011 with an expected increase to more than $259 billion in 2016
(BCC, 2011). Nevertheless, the overall market value is likely to be
much higher, as the direct selling of microorganisms only
represents a tiny part of the overall value of microorganisms as
crucial intermediaries in basic and applied research. In addition, on
average, over half a million cultured microbial organisms are
distributed through various public service culture collections
which conserve and distribute microbial organisms for basic and
applied research purposes. Although the major part is distributed
to public sector organizations (77% on average), a substantial part
is also provided to for-proﬁt private sector organizations (23% on
average) (Dedeurwaerdere et al., 2012a).
Public service culture collections link academia, industry,
government and international knowledge providers and users of
microbial material. Although the utilization of the materials held in
the collection is subject to the access and beneﬁt sharing
obligations of the country of origin of the isolates, the question
of the full bundle of legal ownership rights over these is highly
context speciﬁc. Nevertheless, most public collections do not claim
any downstream ownership rights on the materials, which they
keep in ‘‘custody’’ or ‘‘in trust’’ for the entire humankind. In
practice, the materials are distributed against the payment of a fee
in order to cover, in part, the additional administrative costs
generated by the management of the distribution system.
The role and functions of the microbial collections as a basic life
science research infrastructure bears a lot of similarities with other
ex situ collections, especially in the ﬁeld of animal and plant
genetic resources, which have been studied elsewhere (Fowler
et al., 2001; Gollin et al., 2000). However, two important features
are speciﬁc to the microbial collections. First, microbial
organisms have extremely high mutation rates upon reproduc-
tion (Dijkshoorn et al., 2010). As a result, there is no equivalent to
the relatively well-deﬁned species concept for plants and animals.
Therefore, microbial science, and private sector research and
development, depend to a large extent on the puriﬁed cultured
organisms held in the microbial ex situ collections. Second, without
globally accepted standards and quality control of microbial holdings,
entire families of clones of collected microorganisms can be
contaminated, as happened in the 1960s with the contamination
of microbial cell lines for cancer research, which has led to over a
decade of invalid scientiﬁc publications (Stern, 2004).
However, the vast majority of microbial diversity is yet to be
discovered (estimated 90–95%). In addition, the combination of the
high cost of conservation of puriﬁed microbes and the very high
intra-species diversity makes it impossible for one collection to
cover the entire breadth of microbial diversity, even for a speciﬁc
set of microbial species. Intense collaboration and exchange
amongst public culture collections is therefore a necessary
consequence of this situation. In the more recent history, these
global collaborations between the culture collections have been
expanded to the public databases containing information on the
country of origin, scientiﬁc publications related to the microbial
holdings of the collections and automatic linkage to associated
genomic information available through open access databases
(Dawyndt et al., 2006; Reichman et al., 2015).
2.2. Challenges regarding the public availability of upstream research
assets
The globally distributed infrastructure of culture collections has
led to major scientiﬁc progress and technological innovations in
the past, covering food security, environmental management,
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pressures on public funding (Stackebrandt, 2011) and an increasing
overlap of basic and applied commercial research (Cook-Deegan and
Dedeurwaerdere, 2006), the public availability of both microbial
research materials and the associated data has increasingly come
under pressure. Three major challenges illustrate this increasing
pressure.
The ﬁrst challenge is related to the deposit and availability of
microorganisms for further downstream research. Currently, over
200,000 new samples of microorganisms are deposited each year
in the collections of the World Federation for Culture Collections,
which are collected from natural environments in all geographical
regions of the world (Dedeurwaerdere et al., 2012a). However, this
only represents a tiny fraction of new microorganisms that are
yearly discovered and referred to in published research. A
2008 survey preformed on 8 European Microbiological Journals
aptly illustrates this ﬁrst challenge (Stackebrandt, 2010). In the
835 articles reporting research on a total of 20,200 new isolates,
only less than 1% of these isolates were deposited in public culture
collections. In addition, an important portion of these strains
already died or was included in a patent application process and
therefore became unavailable. Even though it seems reasonable to
operate a selection amongst these isolates, the majority of paper
authors did not deposit any materials, which is very worrisome as
conservation and availability of a selection of these materials is
necessary to replicate the research ﬁndings and for follow-on
research (Stackebrandt, 2010). However, except for some journals
such as Nature, the recommendation given by most scholarly
journals to deposit research materials in well recognized
repositories is not strictly implemented and thereby left to the
discretion of the researchers. Even though major culture collection
networks have offered to accept all materials during or shortly
after publication, there is no clear reversal of this trend, in
particular due to the increasing competitive pressures on the
scientists.
A second challenge is related to the availability of the research
data, in particular the environmental and genetic sequence data
associated with the microbial strains. As noted by many scholars,
maximizing open access to basic data sets is essential for the rapid
translation of research results into knowledge, products and
procedures to improve matters of general interest (Stiglitz et al.,
2000; Dawyndt et al., 2006). In response, various high-level policy
initiatives have supported open availability of research results,
such as the compulsory open access policies of the US National
Institutes of Health and the European Research Council, or the
Bermuda principles for rapid and public release of DNA sequence
data, which have been endorsed by major science funders and
publishers. However, in the same time, scientists often make data
available only after major delays, even after the publication of the
ﬁrst scientiﬁc results from this data. The latter has been well
documented for the case of access to research samples and
genomic data in the life sciences (Dedeurwaerdere, 2006; Walsh
et al., 2007). As shown by a major cross-disciplinary survey, the
main reasons for lack of sharing are limited time and funding for
infrastructure support (Tenopir et al., 2011).
The adoption of the Nagoya Protocol might have an impact on
both these challenges and add a third layer of barriers to the public
availability of upstream research assets. In principle, the imple-
mentation of the Protocol can be supportive of the existing
practices of global cooperation in biodiversity research. The latter
is in line with one of the objectives of the Protocol, which is to
foster biodiversity research, as stated in several of its provisions
(Dedeurwaerdere, 2010b). However, the implementation of the
Protocol also requires a clear tracking and monitoring of the access
agreements and of the utilization of the accessed materials by all
the parties involved in international exchanges, which mightdramatically increase the transaction costs for the operation of the
commons. Nevertheless, in the ﬁeld of the exchange of materials,
many of the collections that are member of the WFCC have already
taken steps to contribute to such tracking and monitoring, without
major impact on the hampering of the exchanges. In particular, the
use of a formal Material Transfer Agreement and the documenta-
tion of countries of origin is an established practice, even though
new constraints for such monitoring and/or documentation might
arise in the context of the implementation of the Protocol
(Dedeurwaerdere, 2010a). In contrast, the fate of public availability
of environmental and genomic data, that are associated with the
microbial holdings, is still highly uncertain (Greiber, 2014).
This papers aims to analyze how and to what extent the existing
practices of the collections are able to overcome these three
challenges to the public availability of upstream research assets.
The next section addresses the ﬁrst two of these challenges, based
on the literature on the models for overcoming collective action
failures in scientiﬁc research commons. The detailed discussion of
the third challenge falls partially out of the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, two speciﬁc questions will be addressed in relation
to the third challenge. First, is there evidence of any impact of
existing access and beneﬁt sharing regulation on the sharing
practices; and, second, what best practice guidelines can be
derived from the results of the analysis in this paper that can serve
as input into the discussions on the implementation of the
Protocol?
3. Overcoming collective action failures through social
production and collaborative economy models
Economic theory of public goods provision highlights major
collective action challenges for organizing collaborations in global
commons. In this context, global commons are deﬁned as global
research assets governed by a group of information producers and/
or users under non-exclusive use conditions (Benkler, 2006). Two
core arguments show potential difﬁculties for the long-term
sustainability of such commons. The ﬁrst is based on the so-called
prisoners’ dilemma, which shows that, without clear guarantees on
the other players’ cooperative behaviour, agents will not cooperate
spontaneously, even if greater long-term beneﬁt could be achieved
from cooperation (Ostrom, 1998). The second argument is based on
the free rider problem in public good provision, which shows that,
without enforcement measures, some people will attempt to
beneﬁt from public goods that are produced, without contributing,
as it is publicly available once it is produced by others (Sandler,
2004). As a result, even if institutional rules are found to overcome
the prisoners’ dilemma by the involvement of a core group of
contributors, the overall provision of the public good can still be
less than what could be the case if all the players would contribute
in a fair and equitable manner.
A conventional solution to these problems is to introduce an
external state authority that imposes general interest and long-
term objectives on the individuals (Hardin, 1968). For the
organization of global research commons this would imply to
create a global authority, through a multilateral agreement, with
jurisdiction over the scientiﬁc research assets and which would act
as an external rule enforcer. Important examples of such a solution
are the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture, and the Global Inﬂuenza Surveillance and
Response System of the WHO. Whenever such a global state
authority is not available, an alternative solution proposed in the
literature is to revert to private appropriation of the research assets
under exclusive access regimes (Hardin, 1968) and organize
collaboration on market-based principles. In such a market-based
model, global research infrastructures can be formed spontane-
ously based on voluntary initiatives using competitive monetary
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specialized service collections selling clones of microbial materials
that can be used by industry or universities for speciﬁc research
purposes, such as Forintek Inc., which is a global culture collection
that provides research services and materials to the timber
industry on a for-proﬁt basis (Stromberg et al., 2013).
The global state-like and the global market-like solution for
organizing collaborative research should however not be regarded
as the only possible institutional models. In particular, these two
solutions do not seem to reﬂect adequately the research
collaborations amongst culture collections reviewed above, which
are sustainable even in the absence of exclusive market-like access
regimes or the absence of a global external state-like authority. For
example, many essential knowledge assets for scientiﬁc research
in microbiology are made available by distributed networks of
collections that share these resources on a partially or totally non-
exclusive basis. The latter points to the relevance of a third
solution, which is based on the operation of social networks and
the internalization of collective goals in so-called social production
models of knowledge (Benkler, 2006). Scholars of knowledge
commons have analyzed this social production model in more
detail for the speciﬁc cases of the social production of information
on the one hand and the exchange of shareable goods on the other.
These two cases will be highlighted in the next two sub-sections.
3.1. Social production model for informational knowledge commons
Systematic research on generic design principles of governance
of knowledge commons with informational assets, such as
genomic data, software or scholarly publications, has identiﬁed
a set of design principles for successful governance arrangements.
First, this research has shown that, in such commons, participants
are driven more by social motivations (especially reputational and
social identity related motivations) and internalized motivations
(such as the science ethos or other collective values that have been
internalized and endorsed by the actors) (Ryan and Deci, 2000),
than by the prospect of direct monetary rewards (Schweik and
English, 2013; Dedeurwaerdere, 2012; David and Shapiro, 2008).
As a result, global scientiﬁc research commons are in practice
governed by a set of mixed incentive schemes (Benkler, 2006),
which include both self-interested behavioural incentives (such as
direct reciprocity or monetary rewards) and other-regarding
behavioural incentives (such as the science community’s publica-
tion norms and individual scientists’ personal values), along with
collective rules signalling trusted knowledge providers in the
informational economy (Lessig, 2008).
A second common feature is related to the transactional
features of collaboration with information assets. Indeed, not all
modes of organization with distributed information assets lead to
cost-effective transactions (as compared to the option of a
centralized state-based solution). The adoption of distributed
(exploiting the power of digital networks for coordination) and
ﬁne-grained modular architectures (based on a division of labour
amongst geographically distributed components, each specializing
in different sub-tasks that only ask a small additional effort/cost) is
a second major institutional feature bearing on the success of
information-based knowledge commons in digital networks.
According to the scholars of knowledge commons, what is most
important for the operation of such a cost-effective transaction
system, is the sharing of common norms within a network
organization, in order to enable many participants to effectively
pool their efforts and contributions, notwithstanding the fact that
these contributions may vary in quality, focus, timing, and
geographical location (Benkler, 2006).
Scholars of scientiﬁc research commons have analyzed this
social production model in more detail for the speciﬁc cases ofpractices of information-sharing throughout the scientiﬁc research
process, such as intermediary results or new yet unpublished data
and bio-materials. They show that the sharing practices are highly
context dependent because of the different trade-offs that exits
between the communal norms of scientists and the competitive
incentives for researchers during the research process. In particu-
lar, researchers might keep information secret during pre-
publication stage, or even after the publication of the ﬁrst research
results, with a view to gaining possible future reputational beneﬁts
from further downstream research with that same information
(Dasgupta and David, 1994). In the case of so-called general sharing
of intermediary results through public open research infrastruc-
tures, which is the topic of this paper, sharing will depend on the
presence of contextual factors that outweigh the competitive
incentives. As shown in an empirical analysis of bio-scientists in
Germany and the United Kingdom, important factors that
determine the level of general sharing in this context are the value
of feedback (such as providing complementary information on
research results), beliefs about proper acknowledgement and the
level of competition (Haeussler et al., 2014).
As highlighted in introduction, such competitive pressures have
also increased in the case of the researchers and the managers who
decide upon the sharing practices in the culture collections.
Therefore, although most of the assets in the collections are
situated high upstream in the research cycle, the context
dependent beneﬁts are also likely to be crucial to promote sharing
practices with these basic research assets. Two of these factors are
particularly strong in the case of the sharing of materials, which
are, ﬁrst, the increase in scientiﬁc feedback resulting from the
deposit of materials (such as a clear increase in citation rates of
articles when these refer to materials deposited in public
collections) (Furman and Stern, 2011); and the beneﬁts for small
collections that result from participating in a distributed network of
collections with proper standards of tracking and acknowledging the
origin of the assets that they make available (Stern, 2004). In
contrast, in the case of data, because of the difﬁculty to track
downstream uses, such contextual beneﬁts are virtually absent.
Therefore, in the case of data, in addition to the role of the communal
norms of science, external rules of collective action, such as
mandatory deposit of genomic data, are expected to play a much
more important role in the promotion of the sharing practices.
3.2. Collaborative economy model for the sharing of materials
The literature on the social production model combines insights
from sociology of science and economics of science and innovation.
Although many of the arguments can be transposed to the case of
the sharing of basic research materials through public infrastruc-
tures, the model remains insufﬁcient to capture some of the
economic features of the sharing of the microbial materials.
Indeed, differences in distribution costs between information and
materials impose different economic constraints on the sharing
practices.
The key difference in distribution costs between the biological
and the informational resources is related to the nature of the
output. In the case of the informational goods, even though the
original production costs might be high, the use of digital
technologies allows to operate with near zero marginal distribu-
tion and storage costs. Therefore, in the absence of intellectual
property rights, the sharing of the information goods as public
goods generates very few additional transaction costs. In contrast,
in the case of the sharing of biological resources, the marginal
storage and distribution costs can be important, as additional
physical storage is needed for every additional item, and technical
staff is required for managing the long-term storage and quality
management requirements for publicly available microbial
Table 1
Comparison between the research sample and the overall population of collections.
Population of WFCC
members (626)
Research sample
(191)
Type of collection
Governmental 41% 41%
University 43% 40%
Semi-governmental 6% 9%
For proﬁt collection 5% 6%
Industry collection 5% 4%
Geographical situation
Asia 34% 39%
Europe 34% 31%
America 24% 27%
Oceania 6% 1%
Africa 2% 2%
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nisms are needed to use the social production model for the
sharing of material assets.
The main feature that allows keeping the transaction costs for
the sharing of basic research materials low, is that most biological
materials have multiple uses (Dijkshoorn et al., 2010). This multi-
functionality generates a high amount of excess capacity that can
be made available to other researchers. Indeed, researchers and
culture collection managers, who obtain funding for storage
facilities and technical staff to conduct research in a certain
research ﬁeld, can easily duplicate these same puriﬁed microbial
organisms – through cloning – for other research demands in
entirely different locations, without generating important addi-
tional costs beyond some additional administrative costs related to
the ordering and shipping of the materials.
However, in contrast to the informational knowledge com-
mons, shareable excess capacity is depletable upon use and
therefore a certain selection mechanism of potential users needs to
be put in place. Depending on the cost of organizing such a
mechanism and the type of beneﬁts that can be expected,
researchers and culture managers can opt for a social mechanism
for selecting the users (through using social networks and social
production tools) or a secondary market in the excess capacity
(through limiting access and use, pricing the transactions and
monitoring the agreed upon uses).
The governance of material goods that are shared through the
use of digital networks, on the basis of the excess capacity of a
given private good, has been extensively studied over the last
decade in the literature on the so-called collaborative economy
(Botsman and Rogers, 2010). As shown in this literature, the choice
between a social mechanism for organizing the sharing and a
secondary market will depend on a set of transaction and
motivational features of the exchange (Benkler, 2004). In the case
of the market solution for organizing the selection of users of the
excess capacity, an important motivation is the monetary
retribution, but this has to be weighed against the possible
transaction costs generated by the pricing of the goods, the
monitoring of the uses of the excess capacity and the possible loss
of social beneﬁts. In the case of a social mechanism, the
motivations are more of a social and personal nature, such as
contributing to scientiﬁc research or increasing one’s reputation as
a good scientist. The transaction costs, on the other hand, will
depend on the presence or absence of pre-existing social norms
and organizational networks for monitoring the exchanges, and
the possible opportunity costs of not sharing the materials, such as
possible loss of a good reputation in the social networks.
In the case of the culture collections, it can therefore be
expected that the international federations play an important role
in the sharing of the research materials. Indeed, these federations
are intensively involved in the building and enforcing of common
quality standards for the sharing of materials. For instance, the
World Federation requires to subscribe to minimum quality
standards as a condition for membership, while the regional
federations organize intense cooperation amongst the member
collections for the improvement of these and other standards. Such
common rules for quality management facilitate the identiﬁcation
of trustworthy providers and users in a cost-effective manner,
which is important, seen the physical limits (both in the terms of
human resources for cloning and storage capacity) on the overall
amount of excess capacity that can be made available.
4. Data collection, empirical model and mixed method
approach
Structured questionnaires with 26 closed-end questions on
detailed patterns of provision and reception of materials,motivations and beneﬁts, and governance were administered
through a web-based survey tool to a representative sub-sample
of 191 culture collection researchers and culture collections
managers.
4.1. Details of the data collection
The ﬁrst round of surveying was administered to the
participants of the 13th International Conference on Culture
Collections (ICCC 13), September 23rd to 27th 2013 in Beijing. A
second round was organized between October 2013 and February
2014 with a series of additional surveys with the members of the
US, the EU and the Latin American Federation of Culture
Collections, with a view to having a balanced geographical
representation of the sample. In total 191 responses were received
(121 from the Beijing conference, amongst the approximatively
500 participants; and 70 from the email invitations sent to the
3 regional federations). As shown in Table 1, the resulting sample is
representative of the geographical balance and organizational
types of the overall population of culture collections that are
registered on the database of the World Federation of Culture
Collections (cf. http://www.wdcm.org/). Even though some public
collections are still in the process of becoming member of the
WFCC, the composition of the WFCC membership is nevertheless
an excellent approximation of the types of collections and
practices amongst the exiting public culture collections.
Prior to administering the structured questionnaire, qualitative
interviews were arranged with the 2013 president of the World
Federation of Culture Collections (4th June and 29th August 2013)
and a meeting was organized with various culture collection
representatives to discuss the goals of the survey, and make a
quality check of the questions, on 22nd May 2013. Face to face
interviews with 11 culture collection managers on sharing of
materials were held between 23rd and 26th September 2013 at the
ICCC-2013 conference. Finally a workshop was organized on 25th
and 26th September 2014 to discuss the speciﬁc issues related to
data sharing in relation to the Protocol (for the workshop report
(Greiber, 2014)).
4.2. Hypotheses and empirical model
Fig. 1 schematically represents the explanatory variables that
have been addressed in the survey to better understand the role of
the social production and the collaborative economy model in the
public availability of basic microbial research materials and
associated genomic data. Each of these variables refers to different
real-world features, depending on the application of the model to
the sharing of research materials or to the public availability of
associated genomic data. The intermediary variable ‘‘decisions of
Fig. 1. Assessing the role of internalized motivations, external rules/incentives, non-
market orientation and organizational networks in global knowledge commons.
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collection managers and scientists that are directly involved in
handling the received samples, storage and, in an important
number of cases, initial research. This core group sets the general
rules in the culture collections on sharing of materials and data,
taking into account the applicable legal rules and the applicable
rules of their host institutions.
For materials, both variables related to the social production
model and variables related to the collaborative economy model
are expected to be signiﬁcant. Indeed, for materials, distribution
has a marginal cost to all the players and the sharing of the excess
capacity through a social/collaborative mechanism requires
intense coordination and trust building. Therefore, the variable
‘‘organizational network membership’’, which is related to the
collaborative economy model is expected to be positively
correlated. The strength of internalized motivations and the not
for proﬁt nature of the organization play a role both in the social
production model and the collaborative economy model and are
therefore expected to be strongly correlated, while direct
governmental regulation is expected to be negatively correlated.
For data, based on the social production model, the strength of
internalized motivations and the not for proﬁt nature of the
organization are expected to be correlated positively with data
sharing. As distribution has no marginal cost to the players, the
variables related to the collaborative economy model are not
expected to impact on the data sharing.
In the case of data, as reported above, due to the relative lack of
direct contextual beneﬁts from sharing of data (as compared to
materials), important trade-offs between the competitive pres-
sures and the social production model are highly likely, as some
scientists expect to extract reputational rents from temporary
secrecy, providing them the opportunity of being the ﬁrst to
publish certain results. In particular, culture collection managers
face reluctance from scientists to participate to early data release
associated with the microbial materials, through the culture
collections data portals or through public genomic databases.
Therefore, additional external rules from publishers are expected
to be positively correlated with the data sharing.
Finally, the impact of access and beneﬁt sharing regulation
(ABS) is expected to depend upon the compatibility with the social
production and collaborative economy model. In the case of
materials, there is already a long tradition with Material Transfer
Agreements for sharing, which explicitly consider access and
beneﬁt sharing. Therefore, the impact is expected to be positive or
neutral. In contrast, in the case of data, there exists a high degree of
legal uncertainly on the way and the possibility to reach a mutual
compatibility between the public availability and the implemen-
tation of the Protocol. Therefore a negative correlation is expected.
To assess the role of these variables on the decision to allow
further downstream sharing of materials and/or to deposit data on
public genomic databases upon or prior to publishing, the
following two regression models were developed: A ﬁrst model on sharing of materials. This ﬁrst model tests if the
permission to share materials is correlated with
 internalized motivations: duty as a core motivation to provide
materials (variable: Materials prov duty);
 external rules/incentives for sharing: rules on access and
beneﬁt sharing applicable to materials regulated by the
country (variable: ABS country) or the organization (variable:
ABS organization); the government provides incentives for
sharing of materials (variable: Gov. incentives materials) and/
or imposes the rules on conditions of transfer of materials
(variable: Gov. rules materials);
 organizational network membership: membership of regional/
international culture collection federations (variable: Net-
works no);
 Not for proﬁt nature of the organization (variable: For proﬁt)
To account for possible restrictions imposed by the providers
of the materials, 3 sub-models are developed to check the
permission to share if the materials are received from 3 different
categories of organizations: from other culture collections, from
governmental research institutes or from university research
laboratories. As similar variables are likely to play a role in these
3 sub-models, a joint estimation of the three outcome variables is
appropriate. Therefore a multi-variate probit model has been
used (for the justiﬁcation of the choice of a probit, cf. comments
below).
 A second model addresses the early release of genomic data by
research and managers of the culture collections, through their
deposit on external genomic databases, mainly the public
databases from the INSDC (International Nucleotide Sequence
Database Collaboration). This second model tests if the early
release of genomic data is correlated with:
 internalized motivations: duty as a core motivation to provide
materials (variable: Data prov duty)
 external rules/incentives for sharing: rules on access and
beneﬁt sharing applicable to data and information regulated by
the country (variable: ABS country) or the organization
(variable: ABS organization); the government imposes the
rules on conditions of transfer of data (variable: Gov. rules
data); publishers mandate data provision to public online
databases (variable: Publishers’ rules); scientists and/or
national public authorities are consulted when making
decisions on transfer of data (variables Consult nat public
authorities and Consult scientists); perceived importance of
employers’ role in creating willingness to share (variable Perc
employers role).
 Not for proﬁt nature of the organization (variable: For proﬁt)
With a view to verifying the consistency of the results with
previous studies of the distribution patterns of the culture
collections (Dedeurwaerdere et al., 2009; Stromberg et al.,
2013), the following control variables were also included: private
sector provision, contributions from public sector research
organizations, formal permission for redistribution and reception
from other culture collections and the international orientation of
the collections.
4.3. Data analysis method
The decision to share can reasonably be represented by binary
response variables (closed question 9 of the questionnaire), but
this decision varies with the source of the material. The main three
sources of materials in the sample are ‘‘other culture collections’’,
‘‘government research institutions’’ and ‘‘universities’’. We there-
fore modelled the decision to share materials through three
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used a multivariate probit, allowing to jointly predict the decision
choice when receiving materials from one of these three sources.
All explanatory and control variables of the models were derived
from the close-end questions of the structured questionnaire (cf.
table in Annex A and the list of close-ended survey questions in
Annex C). The original survey data is available online and can be
retrieved through a search for the article title on the EU open access
infrastructure for research data zenodo (www.zenodo.org).
5. Combining internalized motivations and organizational
networking for the sharing of upstream research materials
5.1. Presentation of the results
For the analysis of materials, we chose a multivariate probit
estimation to take the correlation of error terms into account (cf.
Table 2). The multivariateprobit was estimated jointly for the three
dependent variables. The P-value of the Wald test for the overall
signiﬁcance of the regression is very low (0.0001), indicating that the
multivariate regression is highly signiﬁcant. The Likelihood ratio test
of rho21 = rho31 = rho32 = 0 rejects the null hypothesis at the 1%
signiﬁcance level: chi2(3) = 32.5639; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000. The
P-value of the probit estimation for early data release is very low
(0.0000), also indicating a highly signiﬁcant regression (cf. Table 3).
Conventional collinearity tests amongst the explanatory and control
variables were conducted within Stata and showed no sign of
collinearity amongst the variables (mean variance inﬂation factor
(VIF) = 1.27 and 1.17 for the regression on materials and genomic
data, respectively; SQRT VIF below 1.5 for all variables).
5.2. Discussion of the results
In the three sub-sections below, we ﬁrst discuss the variables
that are signiﬁcant at the 1% or the 5% level for at least two of the
three outcome variables in the model for sharing of materials
(MSHARING ALLOW) and for the single outcome variable in the
model for public availability of data (EARLY DATA RELEASE). The
last sub-section then shortly discusses the remaining variables
that are weakly signiﬁcant in one of the two models and which
have not been addressed before.Table 2
Results of the multivariate probit estimation on the sharing of microbial materials. For th
A–C.
Outcome variable: MSHARING ALLOW (n = 120)
Receive
Signif. 
Explanatory variables
Non-proﬁt orientation For proﬁt td:paraenter () 
Organizational network membership Networks no td:paraenter ()*
Internalized motivations Materials prov duty (+)*
External rules/incentives for sharing Materials ABS country (+) 
Materials ABS org () 
Gov incentives materials (+) 
Gov rules materials ()**
Control variables
Provenance of materials Other cc (+) 
Collection abroad (+)**
Size/nature of contributions of materials Home contribute ()**
Private sector no ()***
Formal third party use for some (+)**
Capacity Receive governt funded large (+)**
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.5.2.1. Most signiﬁcant variables of the social production model
The general outcome of the survey conﬁrms the hypothesis that
a speciﬁc set of social motivation features underlie the functioning
of global knowledge commons. Indeed, in case of materials, the
variables that play a role both in the social production model and
the collaborative economy model (internalized motivation and
non-proﬁt orientation) are signiﬁcantly correlated with sharing of
materials. In the case of data, only the non-proﬁt orientation is
highly signiﬁcant, and not the internalized motivations. The latter
might reﬂect the higher degree of rents that can be obtained from
data secrecy, and the lesser expected contextual beneﬁts from data
release as discussed above.
5.2.2. Most signiﬁcant variables related to the organizational
networking, the competitive pressures and the access and beneﬁt
sharing regime
To account for the observed level of sharing of materials, the
model needs to be completed however. In the case of materials,
internalized motivations alone are not sufﬁcient to account for the
observed level of sharing amongst the collections. The observed
levels of sharing are reached when one combines internalized
motivations and organizational networking. Indeed, for all the
outcome variables, the percentage of sharing behaviour in the sub-
group of respondents that replied positively to ‘‘Materials prov
duty’’ (value = 1), but which are not member of any network
(value = 1 for ‘‘Networks no’’), is substantially less as compared to
the remaining organizations in the sample (for this sub-group the
percentage decreases respectively with 11%, 23% and 23% for the
outcome variables received from cc, received from gov res instit
and received from univ, as compared to the remaining organiza-
tions). In addition, the combined model provides better results
than alternative models that estimate the decision to share
materials based on the social production or on the collaborative
economy model alone. For instance, a model without the variable
‘‘Materials prov duty’’ but with the variable ‘‘Networks no’’, or a
model without the variable ‘‘Networks no’’ but with ‘‘Materials
prov duty’’, provides less signiﬁcant estimations on the core
explanatory variables as compared to the combined model of
Table 2 (we omitted two control variables ‘‘Home contribute’’ and
‘‘Receive governt funded large’’ in this comparative exercise, in
order to reach convergence of the multivariate probit estimation
for all the tested models).e deﬁnition of the variables, descriptive statistics and correlation matrix, cf. Annexes
d from cc Received from gov res instit Received from univ
Coef. Std. err. Signif. Coef. Std. err. Signif. Coef. Std. err.
6.6761 464 ()** 2.8107 1.0883 ()** 1.6868 0.7661
0.8956 0.4630 ()** 0.8711 0.4383 ()*** 0.9898 0.3585
0.5923 0.3396 (+)*** 1.3029 0.3492 (+)*** 0.9318 0.2974
0.2395 0.3702 (+)** 0.8921 0.4328 (+) 0.0389 0.3600
0.0212 0.3891 () 0.0025 0.4010 () 0.0611 0.4195
0.5883 0.3723 (+) 0.0490 0.3862 (+) 0.4395 0.3617
1.0696 0.4602 () 0.7146 0.4515 (+) 0.0444 0.3780
0.2456 0.5735 () 0.4834 0.4356 () 0.2961 0.3808
1.7059 0.7099 (+)** 1.0249 0.5048 (+)*** 1.1586 0.4048
1.4521 0.7102 (+) 4.9234 366 (+) 1.2131 1.0633
1.1596 0.3854 () 0.3371 0.3382 () 0.4697 0.3066
0.7084 0.3430 (+)** 0.7741 0.3330 (+)** 0.6777 0.2986
1.8068 0.7751 (+)** 2.6364 1.0988 (+) 4.5865 526
Table 3
Results of the probit estimation on the early release of genomic data. For the deﬁnition of the variables, descriptive statistics and correlation matrix, cf. Annexes A–C.
Outcome variable: EARLY DATA RELEASE (n = 112)
Signif. Coef. Std. err.
Explanatory variables
Non-proﬁt orientation For proﬁt ()** 1.3077 0.6267
Internalized motivations Data prov duty (+)* 0.6242 0.3343
External rules/incentives for sharing Data ABS country ()*** 0.9723 0.3440
Data ABS org ()*** 1.2133 0.3226
Publishers’ rules (+)** 0.5718 0.2887
Perc employers role (+) 0.5503 0.3793
Gov rules data (+) 0.3843 0.3755
Consult nat public authorities (+) 0.4418 0.2854
Consult scientists ()** 1.0179 0.3994
Control variables
Provenance of materials Collect abroad (+) 0.3017 0.3681
Size/nature of data contributions Contributiongd large (+)*** 1.3858 0.2792
Capacity NonOECD/BRIC ()** 0.6115 0.3008
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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collaborative economy model of the sharing of excess capacity,
which points to the role of organizational networks in selecting
trustworthy users and providers of excess capacity. The networks
that play a role in the case of the culture collections are the World
Federation and the 5 regional federations that closely collaborate
with the World Federation (respectively the 2 Asian federations,
the European Federation, the North American Federation and the
South American Federation) (acronyms cf. table in Annex A).
In the case of data, as discussed above, competitive pressures
amongst scientists tend to play an important role in the trade-off
with the social production model, as can be witnessed from the
signiﬁcant positive correlation with external incentives (Publish-
ers’ rule) and negative correlation with the consultation of the
scientists (Consult scientists).
Finally, the impact of access and beneﬁt-sharing (ABS) rules on
the scientiﬁc research commons shows a clear contrast between
the case of data and materials. Indeed, the existence of ABS rules
does not have a highly signiﬁcant impact on the sharing of
materials, while ABS rules related to data are correlated to a
signiﬁcant decrease in public data deposit (both for ‘‘Data ABS
country’’ and ‘‘Data ABS org’’). This result can be related to the legal
uncertainty surrounding the impact of ABS on data in the
collections, in contrast to the case of materials where material
transfer agreements for ABS have been discussed and implemented
for a long time.
5.2.3. Most signiﬁcant control variables
The relevance of these results for the discussion of the global
regulation of scientiﬁc research commons is further underlined by
the analysis of the control variables.
First, increased sharing of materials is correlated with a more
international orientation in the acquisition of new materials
(‘‘Collection abroad’’). Moreover, the variable that controls for the
presence of type strains or other reference strains in the recipient
collection (‘‘Formal third party use for some’’) is signiﬁcant and
positive as can be expected from the previous studies. Indeed, such
formal contracts are speciﬁcally important for type strains (cf. the
regression results in Stromberg et al., 2013), as these reference
taxonomic strains should be available for the community in
compliance with the rules of the World Federation of Culture
Collections. Furthermore, the variable ‘‘Receive govern funded
large’’ (receiving over 50 samples a year from government
institutions) is indicative for collections with large storage capacity
(Dedeurwaerdere et al., 2012b). Deposits of samples for furtherdownstream distribution is likely to be done in priority in such
larger collections, which often have more resources to organize
distribution and long-term storage of samples.
Second, the control variable ‘‘Contributiongd large’’ is signiﬁ-
cant and positively correlated with the early release of data, which
is consistent with the importance of human resources for
organizing data contribution (Tenopir et al., 2011). The same is
true for the non-OECD/non-BRIC organizations (‘‘NonOECD/BRIC’’),
which can be presumed to have less capacity for data contribution.
5.2.4. Some remaining weakly signiﬁcant variables
For materials, the variable ‘‘Home Contribute’’ is only signiﬁ-
cant in the case of culture collections. This might mean that in the
case of culture collections, less permission is given for downstream
sharing to recipients for collections that do not have a clear
international service orientation. The absence of provision to
private sector companies (‘‘private sector no’’) is negatively
correlated to the permission for further downstream sharing for
materials when these are received from culture collections. This
latter feature is in line with the results of a previous survey that has
shown that the private sector is a key user of public good services
of the culture collections (Stromberg et al., 2013), especially of the
taxonomic reference organisms (type strains) and reference
organisms used for regulatory purposes. These general purpose
organisms are amongst the most important category of organisms
that are exchanged as shareable goods.
Finally, the variable ‘‘Gov rules materials’’ is only signiﬁcant for
materials received from other culture collections. The impact of the
government policies on the permission to share is therefore not
consistent amongst all kind of organizations. This might indicate
the weak importance of this variable, but is also in line with the
heterogeneous institutional nature of the organizations in the
sample.
6. Options and best practices for public availability of upstream
research assets
The survey results conﬁrm the importance of the social
production model for public availability of basic research assets
in life science research. Three features that were highlighted in this
study seem especially relevant in the overcoming of the challenges
to the public availability of upstream research assets. First, seen the
important role of the organizational networks in the decentralized
monitoring of the quality of the research materials that are shared
amongst the collections, a further strengthening of these networks
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institutionalization. Second, both for materials and data, internal-
ized motivations related to the contribution to the overall science
fabric are more important than direct reciprocity or personal
monetary gain. Therefore, commons are unlikely to thrive in the
absence of soft law arrangements like codes of conduct and
community norms that build consensus on the core values of the
system. Third, scientists and managers seem to be more reluctant to
publicly release data, as compared to the sharing of excess capacity
in materials, in the absence of strong governmental/research
funders’ incentives or regulations. Such differences between the
role of external regulators in the data and materials commons could
also lead to envision different pathways for further development of
public research infrastructure in these two domains.
Although a more detailed institutional analysis would be
required, the general features that result from this study provide
some indications for best practice guidelines for a mutually
supportive implementation of the Protocol on the one hand and the
further institutionalization of the public research infrastructures in
upstream research assets on the other. First, approximately half of
the collections contribute to the global science commons by
allowing further downstream sharing of research materials by
qualiﬁed collections for handling microbial materials (between
42 and 62%, cf. table in Annex A). In order to comply with the
tracking and monitoring obligations of the Protocol, a further
reﬁnement of this system will probably be required (Reichman
et al., 2015). Some prominent initiatives have already implemen-
ted such a system, such as the European Culture Collection
Organisations’ standard MTA (Cf. www.eccosite.org) and the
model agreement adopted by the EU MICRO B3 Consortium for
marine microbial research (von Kries et al., 2015). Second, the main
motivational drivers of the research commons are related to norms
and social networks, not to direct reciprocity. Therefore, the further
investment in codes of conducts and guidelines that integrated ABS
concerns seems a crucial component for a mutually supportive
implementation. Finally, the legal uncertainty surrounding the
issue of access to upstream research data appears to have a
negative impact on early data release. Therefore, a further
clariﬁcation of the legal issues and the development of possible
legal models for public availability of upstream research data
under the Protocol, with a view to reducing such uncertainty, will
be required for a long-term institutionalization of the research
commons.
7. Conclusion
This paper analyzed the barriers and opportunities for building
global scientiﬁc research commons under the Nagoya Protocol,
through a speciﬁc case study of the global sharing of microbial
assets and associated microbial genomic data. Overall, the study
conﬁrms the hypotheses of the social production model of
information and the collaborative economy model of the sharing
of excess capacity in research materials. These models are an
important type of non-commercial exchange of research materials
and associated data, which is an important ﬁeld of legislative
activity under the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol.
Therefore, an attention to the speciﬁc motivational and transaction
costs features of these commons will be crucial in a mutually
supportive institutionalization of international public research
infrastructures and the implementation of the Protocol.
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